julian
5c6a21e2c3
The desktop shell is one generic .deb/.AppImage distributed via mca/public_releases, not built per-booth, but the backend origin was baked in at build time (VITE_API_BASE, hardcoded to http://127.0.0.1:3000) — the same installer could never point at a different appliance without a rebuild. Adds ConnectScreen (shown before Login in Tauri when no backend is saved), backed by tauri-plugin-store persisting the operator-entered URL across restarts. CSP's connect-src tightens to 'self' only — all backend traffic already routes through tauri-plugin-http/websocket, which run Rust-side and are outside connect-src's reach anyway — and the real access boundary moves to capabilities/default.json's http:default scope, wildcarded so an operator-chosen host is actually reachable. Adds a "Change server" control in Setup (desktop-only) to repoint an already-configured install. While tracing the desktop auth path for this: tauri-plugin-http's fetch() runs through Rust's reqwest, which keeps its own cookie jar separate from the webview, so document.cookie on tauri://localhost never sees the parking_csrf cookie the server sets (open upstream bug, tauri-apps/tauri#13045/#11518). This means the desktop app has likely been silently sending no CSRF header on every mutation since the shell was first built — pre-existing, independent of this change. Fixed by having sessionView() (routes/auth.ts) also echo the CSRF value in the login/me JSON body; the desktop client stashes it in memory and echoes that instead of reading document.cookie. assertCsrf() itself is untouched. Verified end-to-end against a real LAN-bound dev server: login returns a csrfToken matching the cookie, a mutation using the body-sourced token in X-CSRF-Token succeeds (200), and the same mutation without it still correctly 403s.